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1 Introduction 
 
Intellectual property law has evolved significantly from granting protection solely to 
physical humanly readable works, to granting protection for piano rolls, photographs, 
and eventually even to protecting computer programs as literary works.  Such terms of 
art as a “copy” and “fixation” for purposes of copyright have been stretched beyond 
anything that was perhaps imagined at the time these terms were first used in copyright 
law.  The temporary storage of a work on one’s computer is now considered a “copy.”  
A video game, the audio-visual representation of which changes based on the identity of 
each user, has been held to be “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression.  Without a 
doubt, technological advances have influenced intellectual property laws to a great 
extent, proving that where there is a will (to get intellectual property protection) there is 
a way (to grant it).  Profitable entities such as music production companies, 
pharmaceutical corporations, as well as the multitude of companies that have registered 
their logos as corporate trademarks undoubtedly constitute powerful lobby groups that 
continue to influence the evolvement of intellectual property laws.1  But perhaps in our 
race to develop new technologies and then patent, copyright, and trademark them, we 
had forgotten something.  Something without a powerful lobby group, but something 
which has served as an inspiration for a number of currently protected intellectual 
property works: the intangible cultural heritage of the indigenous people. 
 
Until recently, intangible cultural heritage of the indigenous people was not something 
that has been frequently contemplated by legislators, courts, or international law 
makers.  Although at first glance intellectual property law may seem like a logical 
means of protection for intangible cultural heritage, numerous indigenous works which 
are passed on from generation to generation and have no discernable author may not 
qualify for such protection.  As a consequence, this resulted in exploitation of 
                                                
1 Lorie Graham & Stephen McJohn, Indigenous Peoples and Intellectual Property, 19 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 313 (2005). 
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indigenous knowledge and art by third parties without any retribution—or attribution—
to the indigenous communities.  Recently, efforts by international organizations such as 
UNESCO and WIPO have brought this issue to the forefront.  Scholarship has emerged 
arguing for an array of solutions, including developing new international treaties, 
proposing sui generis legal protection, or using non-IPR existing means of protection.  
This thesis examines several existing means of legal protection for intangible cultural 
heritage, including intellectual property law, unfair competition law and digital rights 
management.  It argues that, firstly, intellectual property law can be effectively applied 
to grant protection to some forms of intangible cultural heritage.  Secondly, for those 
types of indigenous works where intellectual property proves inadequate, for example 
when indigenous legends—too old to qualify for copyright protection—are appropriated 
by book authors, unfair competition law may be used to fill the gaps.  Finally, this thesis 
looks at digital recording and digital rights management of intangible cultural heritage 
through the use of which further legal remedies may be possible.   
 
This thesis is organized as follows.  Part 2 defines intangible cultural heritage and 
discusses specific instances of exploitation of intangible cultural heritage of indigenous 
people, including exploitation of music, imagery, and identity.  Part 2 then discusses the 
reasons why intangible cultural heritage should be protected and explores legal issues 
that are unique to intangible cultural heritage.  Such issues include the issue of 
communal right ownership common to much of indigenous intangible cultural heritage 
which, when juxtaposed with individual nature of rights in Western legal thought, may 
be difficult to apply in courts.  Part 3 discusses currently existing legal protection which 
can be applied to intangible cultural heritage, including intellectual property and unfair 
competition laws. Part 3 illustrates such application by discussing several court cases.  
Part 4 discusses recent efforts made by WIPO to encourage digital documentation of 
intangible cultural heritage as additional means to supplement some of the inadequacies 
of intellectual property protection of intangible cultural heritage.  Part 5 concludes this 
thesis, arguing that intellectual property laws combined with unfair competition, equity 
and digital documentation when used together may provide adequate means of 
protection of intangible cultural heritage. 
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2 Issues in Exploitation of Indigenous Intangible Cultural Heritage 
2.1 Definitions 
 
The definition of cultural heritage has varied throughout the years.2  Cultural heritage 
can refer to a variety of things, for example the historical heritage of a country such as 
an architectural site or geographical areas in need of conservation.3  It may also refer to 
religious relics of sub-cultures within a country, such as those of the indigenous people.  
The term encompasses all of these things and has been summed up by UNESCO as 
“entire spirit of a people in terms of its values, actions, works, institutions, monuments 
and sites.”4   
 
Cultural heritage can be divided into two categories: tangible and intangible.  Tangible 
cultural heritage generally refers to physical objects or property of historical, aesthetic 
or anthropological significance, such as artifacts or architecture.5  Legal issues with 
respect to tangible cultural heritage generally arise in the context of illegal trafficking of 
the property, or at times of armed conflict when physical objects of cultural significance 
are either destroyed or looted.  Tangible cultural heritage is also relevant with respect to 
preservation and safeguarding of items found in museums.6  The international discourse 
in the context of cultural heritage has mainly focused on its tangible aspects.  Today, as 
                                                
2 See UNESCO, Cultural Heritage, http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php-URL_ID=2185&URL_DO 
=DO_ TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2010). 
3 Erin K. Slattery, Preserving the United States’ Intangible Cultural Heritage: an Evaluation of the 2003 
UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage as a Means to Overcome 
the Problems Posed by Intellectual Property Law, 16 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 201 (2006) 
(defining “natural cultural heritage” as a type of cultural heritage in general). 
4 UNESCO, Cultural Heritage Sites, available at http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=1535& URL_ DO= DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2010); see 
also Slattery, supra note 3, at 204. 
5 Slattery, supra note 3, at 206. 
6 UNESCO, Movable Heritage and Museums, available at http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=34324&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2010). 
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a result of this discourse, tangible cultural heritage is protected under international 
treaties and conventions.7     
 
The focus of this thesis, however, is on intangible cultural heritage, the definition of 
which has also varied.  UNESCO defines intangible cultural heritage as 
 
the practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills—as well as 
the instruments, objects, artifacts and cultural spaces associated 
therewith—that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals 
recognize as part of their cultural heritage. This intangible cultural 
heritage, transmitted from generation to generation, is constantly 
recreated by communities and groups in response to their environment, 
their interaction with nature and their history, and provides them with a 
sense of identity and continuity, thus promoting respect for cultural 
diversity and human creativity.8 
 
However, this is but one definition.  Intangible cultural heritage has also been defined 
as “performances such as dance, song and story as well as knowledge systems—the 
diverse ways in which people understand the world around them, their language, 
cosmology and spiritual beliefs, even traditional systems of healings.”9  Others have 
used the term “cultural intellectual property” instead of “intangible cultural heritage,” to 
refer to the cultural works that might fall under the traditional rubric of intellectual 
property laws.10  Indeed, the two terms have largely the same meaning as the term 
“intangible” is generally referred to non-physical or incorporeal and “when applied to 
property, would include intellectual property.”11  In sum, the term intangible cultural 
heritage refers to artistic expressions, knowledge and traditions of various cultures.   
                                                
7 See, e.g., The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 
1954, available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0008/000824/ 082464mb.pdf; UNESCO Convention 
on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of 
Cultural Property (Nov. 14 1970), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/ 
001140/114046e.pdf# page=130. 
8 UNESCO, Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage Art.2 (Oct. 17, 2003) 
available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001325/132540e.pdf. 
9 Anita Smith, Protecting Intangible Heritage: Anita Smith Defines Intangible Heritage, 1 (2002) 
available at http://home.vicnet.net.au/~museaust/insite/anita%20smith.pdf, see also Slatterty, supra note 
3, at 207. 
10 Sarah La Voi, Cultural Heritage Tug of War: Balancing Preservation Interests and Commercial 
Rights, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 875 (2003). 
11 Daniel J. Gervais, Spiritual But Not Intellectual? The Protection of Sacred Intangible Traditional 
Knowledge, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 467 (2003). 
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The scope of this thesis, however, is confined to intangible cultural heritage of 
indigenous people.  No one formal definition of “indigenous” exists within the 
international community, although there have been several efforts in defining the term 
in international documents.12  The United Nations Development Group Guidelines on 
Indigenous Peoples’ Issues overview of how international instruments define the term 
“indigenous” is informative.  According to the Guidelines, the term “indigenous” is 
referred to the people who have a temporal priority of occupation of the territory of a 
nation currently established on that territory, who consider themselves culturally, 
ethnically and economically distinct from that nation’s main society and who currently 
form a non-dominant part of that society and follow their own customs, traditions, or 
legal systems.13  Generally, self-identity of a person as indigenous is the most important 
criterion in determining this classification.14  
 
The term “indigenous” as used in this thesis is largely in conformity with the definitions 
laid out by the UN Development Group’s Guidelines mentioned above.  In addition, for 
purposes of this thesis, the phrase intangible cultural heritage will refer to those aspects 
of indigenous people’s culture that would fall under intellectual property classification, 
including artistic works such as music and paintings, and fictional works such as myths 
and folklore.  Further, topics such as rights to a name and designs traditionally 
associated with particular indigenous communities will also be discussed under the 
general umbrella of intangible cultural heritage. 
 
2.2 Outlining the Problem: Exploitation 
 
Developments in technology made it particularly easy and inexpensive to copy 
intellectual property.  Indigenous designs and art have become increasingly popular 
among the mainstream culture.  For example, in Milpurrurru case discussed infra, the 
                                                
12 United Nations’ Development Group Guidelines on Indigenous Peoples’ Issues at 8 (Feb. 2008), 
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/indigenous/docs/guidelines.pdf 
13 Id. at 8-9, citing ILO’s Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), Study of the 
problem of discrimination against indigenous populations (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7), and Working paper on 
the concept of "indigenous people" of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations 
(E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1996/2). 
14 Id. at 9. 
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alleged infringer first tested the market with several designs before finally settling with 
an indigenous design based on Aboriginal artwork which he determined had the greatest 
market demand.  As a result of this demand, marketers see indigenous art and design 
simply as another business opportunity, to be commodified and exploited with no 
compensation or credit to the source.  Below are several illustrative examples of 
commercial exploitation of indigenous artwork, music, and legends, as well as of a use 
trademark disparaging to the indigenous people.15 
 
2.2.1 Two Cases of Infringement of Aboriginal Art in Australia 
2.2.1.1 The Case of Legends on Textiles: Bulun Bulun v. R & T Textiles 
 
John Bulun Bulun, an Australian Aboriginal artist of the Ganalbingu community, has 
been shortchanged twice.  First, unbeknownst to him, the depictions in his paintings 
were printed on T-shirts and then sold to tourists.  He sued, and the case has been 
settled out of court.16  Then he discovered that his work was depicted on clothing fabric 
that was imported and sold in Australia, without his consent.  Bulun Bulun had a valid 
copyright ownership in his paintings under Australian law.  However, Bulun Bulun’s 
work, which has been displayed publicly and has been published in a book, depicted 
sacred images of the Ganalbingu people.  Specifically, the designs portrayed by Bulun 
Bulun, and another artist involved in the case, were Ganalbingu creation legends.  The 
designs’ original maker was said to be the Aborigines’ creator-ancestor, Barnda, and 
they have been passed on since from generation to generation.17  The designs thus 
belonged not to Bulun Bulun, but to his people.  As a result the copyright was not his 
alone, he argued, an argument that was ultimately accepted by the court in Bulun Bulun 
v. R&T Textiles.18 
 
According to the court, the case represented an effort “by Aboriginal people to have 
communal title . . . in their artwork, recognized and protected by the Australian legal 
                                                
15 These examples were chosen to illustrate the relevant legal issues that arise with respect to intangible 
cultural heritage, but they are not by any means exhaustive.  
16 Bulun Bulun and Another v. R&T Textiles Pty Ltd, 86 F.C.R. 244, 252 (1998). 
17 Id. at 249. 
18 Id. 
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system.”19  The claimants in the case asserted not only a claim of infringement of their 
own copyright, but also a claim that the members of their entire tribe, the Ganalbingu 
people, are equitable owners of the copyright in the works.  The claimants argued that 
the subject matter of their work incorporates symbols that are sacred to the Ganalbingu 
people and that under Aboriginal law and custom the Ganalbingu people as a whole 
have the right to allow the reproduction of the artistic work of the tribe.20  Thus, under 
Aboriginal law, if an individual artist wanted to license his or her work, all of the 
traditional Aboriginal owners of the Ganalbingu country would have to give their 
consent, and an individual artist could not give such permission alone.21 
 
After the case was filed, the defendant admitted infringement of Bulun Bulun’s 
copyright and consented to an order of a permanent injunction.22  The issue that 
remained before the court was whether the tribe had an equitable interest in the 
copyright in the artistic work. The court ultimately held that though there is no equitable 
interest in the copyright in the artistic work on part of the tribe, there nevertheless exists 
a fiduciary relationship between the artist and the tribe.  The transaction that gives rise 
to such a relationship is the use by the artist of ritual knowledge of the Ganalbingu 
people in an artistic form.23 As a result of this use, the artist owes a fiduciary duty to the 
tribe.  In particular, the court found that 
 
equity imposes on [Bulun Bulun] obligations as a fiduciary not to exploit 
the artistic work in a way that is contrary to the laws and custom of the 
Ganalbingu people, and in the event of infringement by a third party, to 
take reasonable and appropriate action to restrain and remedy 
infringement of the copyright in the artistic work.24  
 
The court was quick to point out that the finding of the fiduciary relationship only gives 
rise to the right of the Ganalbingu people to bring an action against the fiduciary to 
enforce an obligation, if a fiduciary has not done so.25  They could not bring an 
infringement action against the third party outright.  However, in the event that the 
                                                
19 Id. at 247. 
20 Id. at 249. 
21 Bulun Bulun v. R&T Textiles, 86 F.C.R. at 252. 
22 Id. at 247. 
23 Id. at 262. 
24 Id. at 263. 
25 Id.  
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fiduciary refuses to bring an infringement action against the infringer, the court 
contemplated that an “occasion might exist for equity to impose a remedial constructive 
trust upon the copyright owner to strengthen the standing of the beneficiaries to bring 
proceedings to enforce the copyright” particularly in the case where “the copyright 
owner cannot be identified or found.”26  The court found that in this case the aboriginal 
artist has taken appropriate steps to enforce the copyright, and as a result no additional 
remedies would be granted to the tribe.27   
 
It is notable that in finding the existence of a fiduciary relationship, the court took into 
consideration the law and customs of the Ganalbingu people, stating that “Australian 
courts cannot treat as irrelevant the rights, interests and obligations of Aboriginal people 
embodied within customary law.”28  However, the court did not consider this customary 
law as legally binding but instead considered it as part of the factual analysis of whether 
the fiduciary relationship exists.29  It is also notable that, although dicta, the court held 
that the tribe might be able to nevertheless enforce the copyright in the event that the 
copyright owner cannot be found.  Traditional copyright law only recognizes the 
individual rights of the legal author of that copyright.  As a result, this case illustrates an 
expansion of authorship rights under copyright law recognizing, albeit implicitly, 
collective copyright ownership. 
 
2.2.1.2 The Case of the Trodden Dreams: Milpurrurru and Others v. Indofurn 
 
George Milpurrurru, another leading Australian Aboriginal artist, was a plaintiff in a 
case which involved an infringement of his aboriginal art depicting creation and 
dreaming stories of his tribe.  His work, in which he owned a valid copyright under 
Australian law, was depicted on rugs which were mass-produced in a factory Vietnam 
and sold in Australia.30  The rugs had a notice that profits from the sale of every rug go 
                                                
26 Bulun Bulun v. R&T Textiles, 86 F.C.R. at 264. 
27 Id. at 264-65. 
28 Id. at 248. 
29 Id. at 262. 
30 Milpurrurru and Others v. Indofurn Pty Ltd and Others, 54 F.C.R. 240, 248-49 (1994).  See also, 
Christine Haight Farley, Protecting Folklore of Indigenous Peoples: Is Intellectual Property the Answer?, 
30 CONN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1997). 
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to the Aboriginal artists in the form of royalties.31  Milpurrurru received nothing, as this 
had happened without his consent or that of other artists involved in the case.  
Milpurrurru, two other artists, and the representative of the estates of five deceased 
artists, brought an action against the rug distributor in Milpurrurru and Others v 
Indofurn.32  
 
According to Aboriginal law, the right to create paintings which portray traditional 
creation and dreaming stories is held by the traditional “custodians” of such images.33  
Usually this right is held by a group of people who have the authority to jointly 
determine whether the story and images may be used in artwork, as well as decisions 
with regard to reproduction and distribution of such work.34  Typically permission to 
reproduce such work is given in order to educate the general public about Aboriginal 
culture, as was the case when some of these images were used with permission on 
Australian stamps.35   
 
The infringer in question, Bethune, has made half-hearted attempts to obtain permission 
to reproduce the work in question.  He purchased several rugs from a factory in 
Vietnam that was owned by a relative of a potential customer in an unrelated venture as 
a way to “sweeten” the deal with the latter.36  After testing the market for these rugs in 
Australia, Bethune ordered more rugs with Aboriginal designs with intent to sell them.37  
He then drafted a letter to the Aboriginal Arts Management Association (AAMA) 
which gives advice to Aboriginal people with respect to copyright and has the power to 
bring infringement lawsuits.38  In the letter he indicated the designs he used as well as 
the number and size of the rugs, greatly understating them, and enclosed a check for 
$750 for royalties.39  Although he was made aware that he should wait for the response 
and approval first, Bethune nevertheless proceeded with an exhibition of the rugs and 
                                                
31 Milpurrurru and Others v. Indofurn Pty Ltd and Others, 54 F.C.R. at 281. 
32
 Id. 
33 Id. at 245. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Milpurrurru v. Indofurn, 54 F.C.R 240, at 248. 
37 Id. at 249. 
38 Id. at 250. 
39 Id. 
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offering them for sale without permission.40  The letter addressed to AAMA was 
addressed incorrectly and was never received.41  AAMA was contacted by an arts dealer 
inquiring whether the rugs in question, some of which were on sale for as much as 
$4,252, had copyright approval.42  AAMA then sent a cease and desist letter to Bethune 
requesting cessation of manufacture and sale of the rugs, and a demand for profits.43  
Instead of complying, Bethune and his wife sent a letter to AAMA accusing it of not 
acting in the best interest of the artists by not granting the copyright license.44  Bethune 
later also attempted to contact some of the artists directly, but was likewise refused.  
The case in question was then commenced.  As part of his argument in the case, 
Bethune denied copyright ownership of the artists despite having sought their copyright 
permission earlier.45 
 
The claims asserted by the artists in this case concerned only infringement of their own 
copyright in their works.  Of particular offense to the artists was not only Bethune’s 
offering the rugs for sale without their permission but the medium for reproduction of 
the work: rugs.  Because the imagery depicted were from the sacred creation and 
dreaming stories of the Aboriginal people, having them depicted on rugs on which 
people would walk on was extremely offensive.46 
 
However, despite the individual nature of the claims, evidence with respect to the 
collective ownership in the works under Aboriginal law became relevant in the court’s 
determination of damages.  In particular, the court considered the evidence that under 
Aboriginal law, if the tribe gave permission “to a particular artist to create a picture of 
the dreaming, and that artwork is later inappropriately used or reproduced by a third 
party the artist is held responsible . . . even if the artist had no control over or 
knowledge of what occurred.”47  The artist may be subject to punishment under 
Aboriginal law, which depending on severity of the offense, may include banning the 
                                                
40
 Id. at 251. 
41 Milpurrurru v. Indofurn, 54 F.C.R 240, at 251. 
42 Id. at 252. 
43
 Id. 
44 Id. at 253. 
45 Id. at 255-56. 
46 Milpurrurru v. Indofurn, 54 F.C.R. at 246. 
47 Id. 
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artist from participation in ceremonies or the community altogether, removal of the 
right to create any further artwork involving images or stories of the tribe, or financial 
restitution.48  The court considered this, along with Bethune’s behavior, as evidence for 
“flagrant infringement” to award additional damages in the case.49  In addition, at the 
request of the plaintiffs, the court split the damages in the action equally among the 
infringed parties in accordance with Aboriginal law and custom.50 
 
Both Milpurrurru and Bulun Bulun cases demonstrate willingness on the part of 
Australian courts to use intellectual property laws in combination with principles of 
equity to afford protection to indigenous intellectual property. In particular, Bulun 
Bulun constitutes an important precedent as to collective rights of indigenous people 
under copyright law. 
 
2.2.2 The Case of Disparagement: Pro-Football v. Harjo 
 
The Washington Redskins has been a name of a football team, owned by Pro-Football, 
since 1933.51  The term “redskins” is also a derogatory term that denotes a racist label 
for a Native American person.52  Indeed, in 1930’s when the name was began to be used 
by the football team, Native Americans were reduced to the stereotype of “savages 
whose culture was treated mainly as a source of amusement for white culture” and the 
term “redskins” was used by the public, including newspapers, in association with 
violence, savagery and as a negative racial stereotype.53   
 
A selection of a football team name typically involves something that denotes 
dominance, fierceness, or even violence, designed to strike fear in the eyes of the 
opposing teams.54  Football team names include names of preying animals such as 
                                                
48 Id. at 246.   
49 Id. at 278-281. 
50 Id. at 272.  The Court stated that normally the judge would “specify separate judgment in favour of 
each applicant, assessed according to the loss and damage which each suffered.”  Id. 
51 Pro-Football v. Harjo, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d 1140 (2000) (Harjo III). 
52 Harjo v. Pro Football Inc. 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1828, 1829 (1994) (Harjo I). 
53 Harjo v. Pro-Football, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705, 1719-20 (Harjo II). 
54 Id. at 1720. 
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Lions or Jaguars, as well as team names such as Minnesota Vikings.55  Because the term 
“redskins” was commonly used in association with savagery and violence in 1930’s, as 
a football name it was designed to “evoke the sense of an implacable and ferocious 
foe,”56 which largely promoted the negative connotation of the term.  Pro-Football has 
stated that it picked the term for its football team to honor Native Americans.57  
 
Pro-Football then registered the name “Redskins” as a trademark with United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).  A number of other registrations followed, all 
involving the word “Redskins” either alone or in conjunction with other words.  The 
first registration for “the Redskins” was issued by USPTO to Pro Football in 1967, and 
the last “Redskinettes” to be used in association with a cheerleading team was issued in 
1990.58  A group of Native Americans, who were members of several federally 
recognized Native American tribes, filed a petition for cancellation of these marks with 
the USPTO in 1992 on the ground that they were disparaging.59  The case has been 
litigated since that time for over a decade, resulting in numerous appeals and remands, 
finally culminating with the U.S. Supreme Court’s denial of writ of certiorari in 2009.60  
The ultimate result of this extended litigation was that the petition for cancellation of 
these disparaging marks was denied. 
 
The issue upon which the case turned involved an equitable estoppel doctrine.  At 
common law, equity is applied by courts to rectify what is a wrong, but which does not 
have direct remedy at law.  As a result, in a number of cases involving indigenous 
people, equity is often used to fill the gaps in the law where law itself fails to protect 
them.  It is perhaps ironic that the doctrine of equitable estoppel was used against the 
Native Americans in this case, and in the end was what defeated their cause of action.  
Specifically, the case was defeated based on the doctrine of laches.  
 
                                                
55 National Football League Team Names, http://www.nfl.com/teams. 
56 Harjo II, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1720. 
57 Harjo III, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1140. 
58 Harjo I. 30 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1829. 
59 Id. at 1829. 
60 Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 130 S.Ct. 631 (2009). 
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The respondents in this litigation raised numerous affirmative defenses to the petition 
for cancellation, including laches.61  Laches is an equitable defense similar to a statute 
of limitations; the respondents in this case argued that petitioners had simply run out of 
time in which they could bring the cancellation.  “The doctrine of laches bars relief to 
those who delay the assertion of their claims for an unreasonable time.  Laches is 
founded on the notion that equity aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their 
rights.”62  Unlike the statute of limitations—which states a specific time period in which 
a case may be brought in the relevant statute—laches has no specific time limitation.  
Whether or not a claim is barred by laches is determined by the court on a case by case 
basis, based on its consideration of all the facts in each particular case.63   
 
The petitioner’s cancellation petition was based on Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, 
barring the registration of marks that are immoral, scandalous or disparaging,64 and 
Section 14(3) of the Lanham Act, which states that a petition to cancel a registration of 
a mark may be filed “at any time” if the registration to the mark was obtained contrary 
to the provisions of section 2(a), among others.65  When the petition for cancellation 
was first filed, the USPTO’s Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB), petitioners 
moved to strike the laches defense asserted by the respondents.  They argued that “the 
plain language of Section 14(3) of the Trademark Act—language that allows 
cancellation of registrations ‘at any time’ . . . precludes the application of the laches” 
defense.66  The TTAB held for the petitioners, striking the defense of laches, under the 
public policy interest to prevent a registrant from benefiting from a mark that holds “a 
substantial segment of the population to public ridicule.”67    
 
Respondents appealed the case to federal district court for a de novo review.68  The 
district court overturned TTAB’s decision holding that the petition was barred by 
                                                
61 Harjo I, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1829-30. 
62 NAACP v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. 753 F.2d 131, 137 (D.C.Cir. 1985). 
63 Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 284 F.Supp.2d 96, 138 (D.D.C. 2003) (Harjo IV). (stating that “as 
appropriate in all laches cases, the Court’s holding is specific to the facts and circumstances of this 
case.”). 
64 15 U.S.C. §1052(a) (Lanham Act §2(a)). 
65 15 U.S.C. §1064(3) (emphasis added). 
66 Harjo I, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1830-31. 
67 Id. at 1831. 
68 Harjo IV, 284 F.Supp.2d at 96. 
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laches, however qualifying its decision by stating that it “should not be read as making 
any statement on the appropriateness of Native American imagery for team names.”69  
Native Americans appealed.  The Court of Appeals remanded the case back to the 
District Court on the ground that one petitioner, Romero, was only one year old at the 
time the first mark was registered in 1967, holding that laches would only run against 
that petitioner after he had reached the age of majority.70  Upon remand, the District 
Court held that laches has barred even Romero’s action due to its seven-year and nine-
month delay, but reiterating again that “this opinion should not be read as making any 
statement on the appropriateness of Native American imagery for team names.”71  After 
this judgment the case was appealed again to the Court of Appeals, which upheld the 
District Court’s decision.72  A petition for a writ of certiorari was then made to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, which was denied.73  Because the petition for cancellation of the mark 
was thus denied, the Washington Redskins continue to use the mark in association with 
their football team today. 
 
2.2.3 Something of an Enigma: the Case of Lifvon Guo 
 
It came as a surprise when Lifvon Guo, a farmer and a member of the Taiwanese Ami 
Tribe who also sang traditional chants, received a telephone call from his friend who 
stated “your voice is on the radio.”74  It came as a surprise because to his knowledge his 
voice—which has been described as deep and melodic75—has never been recorded. 
After some investigation it turned out it had been, albeit without Lifvon Guo’s 
permission.  Some years prior to the phone call, the French ministry had invited Lifvon 
Guo and other members of his tribe for a tour, to perform their chants in various cities 
across Europe.76  The group earned $15 for each performance.77  During one of their 
                                                
69 Id. at 144-45. 
70 Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 415 F.3d 44, 48-50 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Harjo V). 
71 Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 567 F.Sup.2d 46, 62 (2008) (Harjo VI). 
72 Pro-Football v. Harjo, 565 F.3d 880 (2009) (Harjo VII). 
73 Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc. 130 S.Ct. 631 (2009). 
74 Renata Huang, Golden Oldies: A Respected Amis Tribe Elder Seeks Recognition for His Chart-Topping 
Chants., FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Nov. 2, 1995. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
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performances, the French ministry recorded them and put together an album.  This CD 
was later heard by Michael Cretu, the creator of the German music group “Enigma.”78  
Lifvon Guo’s chant was just the thing that Cretu was looking for his new album, and he 
paid to the French ministry for the rights to use the song,79 a right that wasn’t the 
ministry’s to sell.  Needless to say, Lifvon Guo had no knowledge of the initial 
recording by the French, nor of the subsequent sale of the rights to use that recording. 
 
Cretu combined the recorded chant with a modern beat to create a song called “Return 
to Innocence” released on Enigma’s album “Cross of Changes.”80  The album, five 
million copies of which were sold, topped the music charts for over thirty-two weeks.81  
Lifvon Guo received neither credit nor remuneration.  Indeed, according to the director 
of Taiwan's Association of Recording Copyright Owners, he was entitled to neither.  
“The original authors of traditional folk chants have long been dead.  And since 
performers are not authors, they have no copyrights,” he was quoted as saying, to which 
Lifvon Guo was quoted as saying “that’s crazy.”82   
 
There was no court litigation in this case and as a result no legal remedy for Lifvon 
Guo.  This case demonstrates some of the legal complexities faced by the indigenous 
people when their intellectual property has been infringed.  First, there is the problem of 
copyrightability per se: for example the lack of fixation of the performance—a 
requirement for copyright protection in some jurisdictions, including the United 
States—in addition to lack of authorship and originality.  Second, there is the issue of 
which forum should try the case, which is dependent on both the jurisdiction of the 
court along with the more practical issue of the ability of the tribe member himself, 
whose resources are very limited, to initiate litigation in a jurisdiction other than 
Taiwan.  Third, as is the case with any cross-border dispute, there is the issue of 
applicable law which may ultimately determine the outcome of the case itself.  Finally, 
unlike the artists in the two Australian cases who were fully aware of their legal rights, 
Lifvon Guo was largely ignorant of legal remedies, if any, that might have been 
                                                
78 Id. 
79 Huang, supra note 74. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
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available to him.  “I'm a country bumpkin" he said, “I know nothing about the legal 
process, but I know that I've been wronged.”83 
 
2.2.4 The Right to One’s Name and Image: the Twilight Saga 
 
The Quileutes, also known as Quillayutes, are a Native American tribe situated on a 
reservation near Washington State’s Olympic Peninsula.84  Most of the tribe members 
live in the reservation town of La Push.85  According to the Quileute folklore, the tribe 
had been created from the wolves.86  Stephenie Meyer is a novelist who penned the 
four-volume “Twilight Saga” about Bella, a young woman who fell in love with 
Edward, a vampire, and Jacob, a Native American who can turn into a wolf and is the 
vampire’s only mortal enemy.  Jacob is a member of the Quileute tribe and lives in La 
Push.  He reveals a legend of his tribe to Bella, a legend he’s “not supposed” to tell.87  
He tells her of a legend which “claims that we descended from wolves—and that the 
wolves are our brothers still.  It’s against tribal law to kill them.”88 
 
The Twilight Saga books became international best sellers, generating an enormous 
amount of revenue.  According to some estimates, the combined revenue from book 
sales, movie ticket and DVD sales, and profits from associated merchandise exceed one 
billion dollars.89  Some of the merchandise depicts the Quileute name and associated 
imagery.  Some have raised concern that there is capitalization on Quileute name and 
images, without Quileutes’ consent or financial compensation, compensation they 
would welcome as “half of Quileute families still live in poverty.”90  However just 
recently, the Quileute tribe announced the opening of an e-commerce website that sells 
authentic Quileute merchandise which is “hand crafted by Quileute artisans and features 
                                                
83 Id. 
84 ROBERT H. RUBY & JOHN ARTHUR BROWN, A GUIDE TO THE INDIAN TRIBES OF THE PACIFIC 
NORTHWEST, 171 (Revised Ed. 1992). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 STEPHENIE MEYER, TWILIGHT, 106 (Atom, 2007). 
88 Id. at 107. 
89 Angela R. Riley, Sucking the Quileute Dry, Op-Ed, NY TIMES, Feb 7, 2010, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/08/opinion/08riley.html. 
90
 Id. 
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carved cedar wolf rattles and paddles; woven cedar baskets and hats; canned smoked 
Salmon from First Beach; ‘Twilight’ inspired handmade items like ‘Jacob’ . . . wool 
hats; wolf dream catchers and other delights.”91 
 
This example demonstrates that cultural exploitation does not always occur to the 
detriment of indigenous people.  The tribe in question was able to successfully embrace 
the popularity of its name and image as a result of the success of the Twilight Saga, and 
use it to its financial advantage.  In addition, had there been an attempt to trademark the 
Quileute name,92 Quileutes would likely benefit from the USPTO policy to deny 
registration of Native American tribal insignia to individuals having no association with 
the tribe.93  But this success may be considered bitter-sweet.  The Quileutes would not 
have been able to reap the profits from selling the merchandise depicting the name of 
their tribe along with traditional tribal imagery without Twilight.  But Stephenie 
Meyer’s Twilight Saga, which earned her much more than Quileutes could ever earn 
from selling the merchandise, incorporated Quileute folklore as part of its story and as a 
result the success of her books may not have been as great without it. 
 
2.3 Outlining the Problem: Why Protection is Important 
 
Protection of intangible cultural heritage is important from a cultural and a historical 
standpoint.  Intangible cultural heritage of the indigenous people contributes to cultural 
diversity of the world.94  Indeed, it is especially significant in terms of the very 
preservation of indigenous culture, as viewed by the indigenous peoples themselves.  
“Indigenous peoples cannot survive, or exercise their fundamental human rights as 
distinct nations, societies and peoples, without the ability to conserve, revive, develop 
                                                
91 Examiner.com, Quileute Nation Opens “Twilight” Website, Authentic Merchandise Store, Mar. 29, 
2010, available at http://www.examiner.com/x-4908-Twilight-Examiner~y2010m3d29-Quileute-Nation-
opens-Twilight-website-authentic-merchandise-store.  For the e-commerce store, see www.Quileute-
Store.com. 
92 A search of the USPTO Trademark Electronic Search System (TESS) revealed no current or pending 
registrations associated with the name “Quileute.”  See http://www.uspto.gov/ebc/tess/index.html (last 
visited Mar. 29, 2010). 
93 See infra, Part 3.2.2.1. 
94 UNESCO, Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, Oct. 17, 2003, 
available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001325/132540e.pdf. 
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and teach the wisdom they have inherited from their ancestors.”95  The erosion of 
intangible cultural heritage as a result of infringement then threatens to undermine the 
very foundation of indigenous culture.  Every time it is stolen by the outsiders for 
financial gain “the heritage itself dies a little, and with it its people.”96   
 
Protection of intangible cultural heritage is also particularly important in the new digital 
age.  Technological advancements and innovation have made copying easy and 
inexpensive.  New technological developments such as digital recording devices to 
record music or cameras to snap pictures of an artwork make reproduction of potentially 
infringing material a rather effortless endeavor.  The Internet provides an easy platform 
for dissemination of such material.  This ease of copying and distribution, combined 
with the growing demand for indigenous art, as demonstrated by the Millpurrurru case, 
makes commodification of indigenous culture by the outsiders especially tempting.  As 
a result, protection of indigenous cultural heritage under the law today is especially 
relevant. 
 
Safeguarding intangible cultural heritage is also significant in terms of ensuring 
financial independence of indigenous people.  One specific example of theft of cultural 
heritage makes a strong case for the need for its legal protection, which is when an 
indigenous group sells its art or craftwork to the public.  As Milpurrurru case showed, 
the infringer in question was able to use the labor of Vietnamese rug weavers for 
relatively low cost97 to manufacture the rugs and then sell the rugs in Australia for 
significant profit.  However the Australian aboriginal artists whose artworks he copied 
did not make rugs themselves, in fact they found the very fact of the imagery being 
portrayed on a rug people walked on offensive.  But in a case where an infringer copies 
art or craft of the indigenous people that indigenous people themselves sell for income, 
the infringer’s action can be particularly detrimental: it can not only undercut the 
indigenous market but deprive the indigenous people of a significant source of 
livelihood. 
                                                
95 Haight Farley, supra note 30, at 12 (internal citations omitted). 
96 Id. 
97 In the case, the Vietnamese “factory” simply received the orders for the rugs, then distributing those 
orders among the local rug weavers who weaved them by hand.  Millpurrurru v. Indofurn, 54 FCR at 248.   
 19
For example, women of the Kunas, an indigenous group in Panama, are famous for 
making molas, which are patterned rectangular panels of fabric that are used as front 
and back panels of blouses worn by the Kuna women.98  The molas are hand-sewn and 
take many hours to make.99  The Kuna women disassemble the blouses once they are no 
longer using them and sell the molas to tourists or collectors, who can then use them as 
either framed art, as part of a pillow case or a quilt, or other decorative uses.100  “The 
mola blouse is an important symbol of Kuna culture and the Kuna’s main source of 
income.”101  However during the 1980’s, as the demand for molas increased among the 
general public, there was a mass of importations of imitation molas by merchants.102  
Because the molas were one of the main sources of income for the Kunas, this wave of 
cheap imported molas had the potential of putting the Kunas at a significant financial 
disadvantage, prompting government action.103 
 
2.4 Outlining the Problem: Legal Issues 
 
Some have raised arguments that current law is insufficient and unfit to deal with 
unique problems posed by infringement of cultural artistic works of the indigenous 
people.104  Indeed, some cases where there was successful application of intellectual 
property law resulting in a victory for indigenous people, such as the Milpurrurru case 
above, have been labeled as an “example of judicial creativity” which may not resolve 
the actual problem.105  In many respects, it is true that intangible cultural heritage poses 
some challenges to the current intellectual property rights systems around the world, but 
it does not mean these challenges may not be overcome.   
 
                                                
98 Irma De Obaldia, Western Intellectual Property and Indigenous Cultures: The Case of the Panamanian 
Indigenous Intellectual Property Law, 23 B.U. INT’L L.J. 337, 357 (2005). 
99 Molas from Panama, About Molas, http://www.panart.com/molainfo.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2010). 
100 Id. 
101 De Obaldia, supra note 98, at 358. 
102 Id. at 359 
103 Id.  
104 See, e.g. Angela R. Riley, “Straight Stealing:” Towards an Indigenous System of Cultural Property 
Protection, 80 WASH L. REV. 69 (2005), arguing that tribal law must play a foundational role to protect 
cultural property of indigenous groups.  See also Slattery, supra note 3, at 231, discussing inadequacies of 
copyright law to protect intangible cultural heritage. 
105 Haight Farley, supra note 30, at 7. 
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One of the biggest challenges posed by indigenous intellectual property, particularly 
with regard to copyright law, is the communal nature of legal “ownership” under 
indigenous customary law.  In particular, indigenous intellectual property such as 
folklore, dance, music and art is passed on from generation to generation, with no 
discernable original creator or one that is long dead.  Under Western legal regimes, on 
the other hand, legal rights are individual.  And as was exemplified by Bulun Bulun and 
Milpurrurru cases above, even though the artists that brought the claim had individual 
copyright in their work, under Aboriginal custom, that right was not absolute.  The right 
to grant permission for use of the works remained with the tribe under Aboriginal 
custom.  This communal nature of ownership poses challenges for indigenous people to 
enforce their rights in courts, for example in terms of having proper standing.106   
 
Indigenous art such as music, songs and dance are rarely recorded—at least by the 
indigenous people themselves—presenting an additional legal hurdle in jurisdictions 
that require fixation of a copyrightable work in a tangible medium, such as the United 
States.  Indeed, a number of “indigenous oral traditions have been transplanted and 
published in printed from by non-indigenous authors who then themselves receive the 
benefits of copyright protection.”107  There may be issues with respect to originality of 
the works.  Finally, certain types of intellectual property rights, including copyright and 
patent law provide protection only for a limited amount of time before the work 
becomes part of the public domain.  Even if copyright is granted to an artist for the 
duration of the artist’s life plus seventy years thereafter, given that some cultures date 
back thousands of years, this amount of time may be so small to render the protection 
meaningless for the indigenous people. 
 
As a result of some of these inadequacies there has been discussion of creation of new 
law to cover the problem of lack of legal protection of indigenous intangible cultural 
heritage.  Some of this discussion focuses on what has been termed “sui generis” 
protection of intangible cultural heritage—namely, a quasi-copyright protection that 
                                                
106 See infra, Part 3.1. 
107 Robert K. Paterson & Dennis S. Karjala, Looking Beyond Intellectual Property in Resolving 
Protection of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Indigenous Peoples, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
633, 639 (2003). 
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would grant protection unlimited in time for indigenous people who would be able to 
assert group, instead of individual, rights.108   
 
However, before a conclusion may be drawn that current legal protection for most types 
of intangible cultural property is inadequate, an account must also be taken of all the 
tools that are currently available with respect to intangible cultural property 
protection—including not only intellectual property and related doctrines such as unfair 
competition, but also digital documentation and digital rights management system.  
Though intellectual property law is not perfect, as no legal regime is, the next section 
will show that it can be applied effectively to protect certain types of intangible cultural 
heritage.  Indeed, the law is not static; it is constantly evolving and fluid to be able to 
cover unprecedented cases that frequently arise.  But where intellectual property fails to 
protect intangible cultural heritage, other legal doctrines, including that of unfair 
competition may be applied.  In addition, digital documentation and digital rights 
management systems may be used for other types of indigenous culture such as music 
and dance to enable indigenous people manage their intellectual property rights 
effectively. 
 
                                                
108 See, e.g. De Obaldia, supra note 98 (discussing sui generis law currently in existence in Panama); see 
also Gervais, supra note 11, (discussing collective intellectual property system). 
 22
3 Existing Legal Framework 
 
This section explores possible avenues of legal protection for intangible cultural 
heritage with a focus on intellectual property, unfair competition and other equitable 
doctrines.  This section ultimately argues that intellectual property law and related 
rights can be applied effectively to cases of infringement of intangible cultural heritage.  
These legal tools can also be used in conjunction with digital documentation of 
indigenous intangible heritage, an effort that is being developed by WIPO’s Creative 
Heritage Project, which is discussed in Part 4.  The first section of Part 3 discusses the 
issues of standing that may be faced by indigenous communities in trying to bring a 
legal case, the second section discusses intellectual property laws including copyright 
and trademark law, the third and final section focuses on unfair competition and equity 
including the right of publicity, misappropriation, quasi-contracts, and trade secrets. 
 
3.1 The Issue of Standing 
 
A legal right to something implies the ability to enforce it, otherwise the right is 
rendered meaningless.109  An individual or a group of individuals typically enforce their 
rights in the court of law.  Under common law, in order to be able to bring an action in 
court one must have standing.  Throughout scholarship written on the topic of legal 
protection of intangible cultural heritage the issue is often ignored, or is addressed 
peripherally, by means of for example describing the problem of ascertaining the 
“author” of the work in question for purposes of copyright.  But the issue of standing is 
crucial to one’s ability to bring an action in court—without standing in the first place, a 
case cannot be heard.110 
                                                
109 Daniel Austin Green, Indigenous Intellect: Problems of Calling Knowledge Property and Assigning it 
Rights, 15 TEX. WESLEYAN L.R. 335 (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1410147, stating that a 
right becomes meaningful once it vests and one may enforce it. 
110 35A C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure § 59 (2009). 
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Standing is in essence the question of “whether the litigant is entitled to have the court 
decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.”  The courts evaluate the 
question of standing at the outset of the litigation, and its assessment—similarly to other 
issues of civil procedure such as jurisdiction and venue—is wholly independent of the 
actual merits of the case.  Under U.S. federal law there are two elements to standing: 
constitutional and prudential.111  The requirements of both must be satisfied before a 
case may be heard in a federal court.112    
 
The concept of constitutional standing arises from Article III of the U.S. Constitution, 
which gives the federal courts the power to hear justiciable cases and controversies.113  
Under the concept of constitutional standing, a plaintiff bringing a case in court must 
satisfy three prongs: an injury in fact, a causal link between that injury and the 
defendant’s conduct, and the ability of the court to redress that injury in a favorable 
way.114  The concept of prudential standing is a judicially created doctrine.115  Under 
the element of prudential standing, a plaintiff must again satisfy three prongs.  First, the 
plaintiff must be the aggrieved party—that is, a third party generally may not bring a 
lawsuit on behalf of someone else.116  Second, it must be proved that the claim is not a 
general one—that the harm suffered is suffered by the plaintiff and is not a general 
grievance that is shared by a large class of people.117  Third, the injury must fall within 
the zone of interest that a statute asserted in the claim is intended to remedy.118 
 
Federal rules of standing do not apply to state courts.119  Nor do they apply to 
administrative proceedings before an administrative agency or board, such as the 
USPTO.120  Cases that may be brought before USPTO include opposition proceedings 
to for example marks that one deems immoral or scandalous under Section 2(a) of the 
                                                
111 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) stating that the inquiry of standing “involves both 
constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise.” 
112 35A C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure §§ 59-61 (2009). 
113 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984), Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
114 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. 
115 35A C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure § 61 (2009). 
116 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 499, Allen v. Wright 468 U.S. at 751. 
117 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 499. 
118 Allen v. Wright 468 U.S. at 751. 
119 1A C.J.S. Actions § 103 (2009). 
120 Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
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Lanham Act.121  Opposition proceedings to marks that are immoral or scandalous are 
relevant to this discussion insofar as the registration of marks by third parties that are 
offensive to indigenous people is concerned, as was the case in Harjo v. Pro-football.122  
In such cases issue of standing may still arise, grounded in the relevant statute that 
confers standing before an administrative agency, such as the Lanham Act.  In order to 
have standing before USPTO, a person must meet the statutory requirement of a belief 
that he or she would suffer damage upon the registration of the mark,123 and two 
judicially created requirements of real interest and a reasonable basis for the belief of 
damage.124  The real interest requirement is similar to the federal requirement of having 
a personal stake in the case—a claimant must demonstrate a “direct injury to 
himself.”125  The reasonable belief of damage may either be found if the person 
challenging the mark possesses “a trait or characteristic that is clearly and directly 
implicated in the proposed mark” or by showing that “others also share the same belief 
of harm” which may be shown by evidence of surveys.126 
 
The issue of standing is crucial to the enforceability of legal rights of indigenous people 
because of the uncertainty with regards to whom the right to be enforced belongs.  As 
mentioned, many indigenous peoples have a different concept of “ownership” and 
“property” from the Western conception of these elements, with the former focusing on 
collectivity and community rather than who owns what, while the latter focuses on 
individual ownership and individual rights.127  The concept of standing therefore 
follows the Western idea of ownership and individual rights, as demonstrated by such 
requirements as plaintiff being the aggrieved party that has been directly injured by the 
defendant’s conduct.  When the claim asserted involves an indigenous community, 
issue of standing gets more complex.  Is any member of the tribe the aggrieved party, or 
only the person that has a direct tie to the property in question? 
 
                                                
121 15 U.S.C. §1052(a) (2009). 
122 See supra, Part 2.2.2. 
123 15 U.S.C. §1063  “[a]ny person who believes that he would be damaged by the registration of a mark 
[may] file an opposition . . . .”.  
124 Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d at 1095. 
125 Id. at 1096. 
126 Id. at 1098. 
127 Green, supra note 109, at 350 (“indigenous populations are fundamentally more collective in their 
societal activities, they historically have a different sense of private property ownership . . .”). 
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A similar issue arose in an Australian case of Onus v. Alcoa before the High Court of 
Australia.128  Plaintiffs in this case were members of a tribe who sought to enjoin the 
defendant from carrying out certain activities on the land that would interfere with the 
tribal relics.129  The claim was brought under the Aboriginal Relics Preservation Act of 
1972, which deems willful or negligent defacing of or damage to archaeological or 
aboriginal relics a criminal offense.130  Lower court held plaintiffs lacked standing to 
sue.131  On appeal the High Court mentioned that “the case is therefore one in which 
two private citizens who cannot show that any right of their own has been infringed 
bring an action for the purpose of restraining another private citizen (Alcoa) from 
breaking the criminal law . . . .”132  The plaintiffs could not therefore rely on the Relics 
Act for standing.  The court, however, stated that standing could also be based if 
plaintiffs have a special interest in the subject matter of the action, an interest in the 
lawsuit which the larger general public does not share.133  The special interest test “is 
the proper one to apply in Australia and . . . appears to be similar to the test adopted in 
the United States.”134  The plaintiffs in this case did have an interest greater than the 
members of the general public, as they would be “more particularly affected than other 
members of the Australian community by the destruction of the relics.”135  The court 
also found significant that plaintiffs in this case were custodians of the relics according 
to tribal law and customs, and have used the relics to educate their children about the 
past.  The court thus held that plaintiffs have standing in this case. 
 
The finding of standing in the Onus case was based on the application of “special 
interest” test.  However the “special interest” test, where one must have an interest that 
is greater than that of the general public, is broader than the requirement of the 
constitutional standing in the U.S. that the harm done by the defendant “must affect the 
plaintiff in a personal and individual way.”136  Under the latter standard only the 
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plaintiff directly injured or a group where each member was individually and specially 
affected would have standing.      
 
The question of standing, at least in the U.S., will largely depend upon the nature of the 
suit (e.g. copyright, trademark, or a common law equitable doctrine).  For example, in 
Harjo v. Pro-Football the group of Native Americans that brought a cancellation 
proceeding was held to have standing because they possess “a trait or characteristic” 
that is directly implicated by the mark.137  In effect this broader requirement of standing 
in the context of disparaging marks allows a claimant to assert group rights—any 
member of that group that is disparaged by the mark can bring an opposition or 
cancellation proceeding—which fits well with the concept of collective rights of the 
indigenous people.  On the other hand, demonstration of standing would be more 
difficult in cases involving individual rights, such as copyright, where a member of a 
tribe who is not the artist or creator of the work tries to bring a claim in court.  Because 
the issue of standing will vary depending upon the nature of the legal claim brought, it 
will be addressed in passing in the next individual sections discussing legal doctrines 
applicable to the protection of intangible cultural heritage. 
 
3.2 Intellectual Property Laws 
 
At first glance, intellectual property laws seem the most obvious choice of protection 
for intangible cultural heritage.  At issue is the protection of intangible cultural works 
such as drawings and paintings, music and songs, storytelling and dance, all of which 
have traditionally been under the rubric of copyright law.138  In addition at issue are also 
names of indigenous people, as was the case with Quileutes, along with symbols, 
images and traditional designs used in the course of trade—the subject matter generally 
under the purview of trademark law.139  As discussed above, some scholars have 
                                                
137 Harjo v. Pro Football, inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1828 (Trademark Tr. & App. Bd. 1994); see also Ritchie v. 
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name could be used in commerce as a trademark.  See also Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc. 
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questioned the ability of intellectual property laws to offer protection for intangible 
cultural heritage, emphasizing the contrast between individual nature of intellectual 
property rights and the “collective rights that might best be used in such areas as 
folklore and traditional knowledge.”140 
 
In addition, scholars who have considered whether intellectual property laws allow for 
proper protection of intangible cultural heritage have tended to focus on inadequacies of 
copyright law.141  Oftentimes a conclusion arrived at is that copyright law alone is not 
adequate for intangible cultural heritage protection, mainly because key elements 
required for copyright protection may be missing: a single discernable author, 
originality, fixation, and if copyright ever existed, the problem of the work having 
fallen in the public domain due to time restrictions on copyright protection.  However, 
copyright is not without problems when it comes to intangible cultural heritage 
protection, but it should not be completely ignored.   
 
For example, group rights are not entirely alien to the framework of copyright law, as 
some have argued.142  Indeed, there are a number of examples of intellectual property 
rights that are owned by groups.  One example is a motion picture, which “may be the 
product of creative contributions from dozens or hundreds of directors, writers, actors, 
costumers, special effects technicians and more.”143  Another example is computer 
software such as video games which likewise include a number of participants who 
have helped create the product.  
 
Aside from copyright there are other protections under the intellectual property 
umbrella, which can sometimes fill in the gaps left open by copyright law.  One 
                                                                                                                                          
be protected upon a showing of secondary meaning.  The case involved children’s clothing with flower 
and fruit patches; the case could potentially be applied to fabric designs such as those of the mola 
discussed above. 
140 Graham & McJohn, supra note 1, at 328, discussing Michael F. Brown, Who Owns Native Culture? 
(2003). 
141 See, e.g. Slattery, supra note 3, at 229-43 (discussing economic and moral rights under copyright law); 
see also Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectivity: Group Rights to Intellectual Property in Indigenous 
Communities, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175, at 179-97 (2000) (hereinafter Riley, Recovering 
Collectivity), discussing the issues of authorship, originality and fixation under copyright law. 
142 Graham & McJohn, supra note 1, at 328 (discussing criticisms of intellectual property laws to offer 
protection to intangible cultural heritage).  
143 Id. at 329. 
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example is trademark law, which has a concept of a collective mark, thus eliminating 
the problem of finding that elusive single owner of a work of cultural heritage.144  
Finally, one must not ignore related doctrines, including those of equity such as 
estoppel or quasi-contract in contract law along with unfair competition. The next 
section explores copyright law—including some successful examples of application of 
copyright law to grant protection to intangible cultural heritage—trademark law, and 
equitable remedies in turn. 
 
3.2.1 Copyright 
 
There are several requirements that must be met before copyright protection may be 
extended to a work.  First, the work at issue must fall under the subject matter of 
copyright protection to qualify for such protection.145  For instance the Berne 
Convention states that protected works under copyright law include literary and artistic 
works.146  If a work falls under the subject matter of copyright protection, it must meet 
the following elements: authorship, originality, and fixation in some jurisdictions.147  
Once these elements are met, the copyright attaches as soon as the work is created even 
without formal registration.  The time limitation on the copyright in most jurisdictions 
is life of the author plus seventy years.148 
 
3.2.1.1 Authorship 
 
The authorship requirement may be an issue for intangible cultural heritage of the 
indigenous people.  The notion of authorship under copyright law has been discussed by 
                                                
144 Id. at 329-30. 
145 ADRIAN STERLING, WORLD COPYRIGHT LAW 610 (Sweet & Maxwell, 2003, 2nd ed.). 
146 Berne Convention Art. 2 (1971) stating that “the expression ‘literary and artistic works’ shall include 
every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its 
expression . . . .” 
147 See, e.g. U.S. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §102 stating that copyright protection subsists in “original 
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”  Fixation is a requirement only for 
some jurisdictions, including the U.S. Other jurisdictions have no fixation requirement. See Berne 
Convention Art. 2(2). 
148 Riley, Recovering Collectivity, supra note 141, at 186-87. 
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U.S. Supreme Court in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony.149  The Court defined 
the term “author” as “he to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker.”150  
Many of the works of intangible cultural heritage are quite old, long exceeding the 
limited time protection under copyright law.  Because they are the product of collective 
knowledge, passed from generation to generation, a single author can rarely be 
identified.  As the Enigma example illustrated, the original author is often either 
unknown or has been dead for centuries, and as a result the work is considered to be in 
the public domain.   
 
Possible authorship classifications of intangible cultural heritage can include a work 
that has no known author (orphan work), which may be the case given that a true author 
of an indigenous song or tale may not in practice be traced, or a joint work of the entire 
tribe.  With regard to orphan works, article 15(4) of the Berne convention leaves it up to 
the individual member states to enact legislation to create an authority to represent the 
author where the author is unknown.151  Such work must not have been published, and 
the unknown author must be presumed to be the national of a country of the Berne 
Union.152  However the Berne Convention still leaves unclear whether this language can 
be attributed to collective works or a just to works by a single unknown author.153   
 
U.S. Copyright Act defines joint work as “a work prepared by two or more authors with 
the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts 
of a unitary whole.”154  It is not a requirement that to qualify for joint work the authors 
must have worked together in concert, just that there is an intention to create such joint 
work from the beginning.155  Some have argued that this “non-linear” concept of joint 
authorship could be applied to intangible cultural heritage of the indigenous people 
which are developed together by a particular tribe and passed on from generation to 
                                                
149 111 U.S. 53 (1884).  See La Voi, supra note 10, at 890. 
150 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884). 
151 Berne Convention Art. 15(4). 
152 Id.  
153 Cathryn A. Berryman, Toward More Universal Protection of Intangible Cultural Property, 1 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 293, 314  (1994). 
154 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
155 La Voi, supra note 10, at 893. 
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generation.156  Others have argued that the intent requirement to create a joint work 
from the beginning would render the concept of joint authorship inapplicable to 
indigenous intellectual property.157  In addition, each joint “author” must qualify for 
authorship in her own right, as a result only those that can be identified as such would 
get protection for their contribution as a joint author.158  Because of either the lack of 
intent or clearly identifiable authors, this concept is also problematic when applied to 
intangible cultural heritage. 
 
Another possible classification of indigenous artistic or literary work for copyright 
purposes is that involving an individual author.  In Milpurrurru and Bulun Bulun cases 
discussed above each Aboriginal artist held an individual copyright in his or her work.  
Indeed, this issue was hardly considered by the court as each painting had a clearly 
identifiable author, whether living or deceased.  The court focused instead on other 
elements of a valid copyright, including originality.  Classification of indigenous work 
as belonging to an individual author who created it, as was with the paintings in the 
Australian cases, would also resolve the problem of standing. 
 
3.2.1.2 Originality 
 
Originality requirement may pose additional questions.  For instance, some have argued 
that because of the emphasis of indigenous art is its function as a historical or a sacred 
document, innovation by the individual artists is often restricted.159  What is valued 
instead is the faithful reproduction of traditional designs depicting the tribal spiritual 
beliefs or history.  As a result creativity is kept to a minimum, which may pose 
problems for the originality requirement under copyright law.160   
 
                                                
156 Id. 
157 Riley, Recovering Collectivity, supra note 141, at 193. 
158 Id. 
159 Haight Farley, supra note 30, at 21-22. 
160 Id. 
 31
As the U.S. Supreme Court held in Feist, the “sine qua non of copyright is 
originality.”161  However, the Court stated that originality does not mean novelty.  
Originality merely means the work is independently created—that is, the work must not 
have been copied from another work—and possesses minimal degree of creativity.162  
The Court held that “the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight 
amount will suffice.  The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they 
possess some creative spark, no matter how crude, humble or obvious it might be.”163 
 
In Milpurrurru, the court addressed at length the question of originality of the 
Aboriginal paintings, particularly since the paintings depicting creation and dreaming 
stories were at least in part based on pre-existing traditions and images.  But the court 
went on to state that although “the artworks follow traditional Aboriginal form and are 
based on dreaming themes, each artwork is one of intricate detail and complexity 
reflecting great skill and originality.”164  The court stated that each painting was unique.  
In particular, of one painting the court stated that even though it used images that were 
“common western desert symbols as part of the design” it nevertheless did not prevent 
the final product from “having a high degree of originality.”165  Thus even though the 
paintings were based on Aboriginal creations stories and dreamings, each artist’s 
individual interpretation of this imagery rendered their work original.  This case 
demonstrates that issue of originality can be overcome with respect to indigenous 
cultural artworks by means of individual artistic choices by the artists. 
 
3.2.1.3 Fixation 
 
Fixation is another issue to consider with regards to intangible cultural heritage.  
Fixation is a constitutional requirement in U.S. copyright law,166 although not 
elsewhere.  There are a number of jurisdictions for which fixation is not a requirement, 
                                                
161 Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).  
162 Id.  
163 Id. (internal quotations omitted).  
164 Milpurrurru and Others v. Indofurn Pty Ltd. 54 FCR 240, 248 (1994). 
165 Id. at 262. 
166 The Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution states Congress is empowered to “promote the Progress 
of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” The Copyright Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl 8. 
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including many civil law countries.  As a result, songs, folklore, designs, et cetera can 
exist without being fixed and still have legal protection.  The only issue that can arise is 
that of proof of copyright ownership, which can be overcome by calling members of a 
tribe as witnesses, or expert witnesses.  Furthermore, even in countries that do require 
fixation the meaning of the term is expanding.  Particularly, the term fixation has been 
relaxed dramatically over the years in order to take into account advances in 
technology. 
 
In White-Smith Music Publishing v. Apollo the U.S. Supreme Court has held that piano 
rolls were uncopyrightable because a work fixed in a copy that is not humanly readable 
is not subject to copyright protection.167  The Court was simply unable to accept the 
idea that something that could only be read by a machine was copyrightable.  This case 
was later struck down and protection was extended to piano rolls.  As other 
technological innovations took place, in order to grant legal protection to new 
technology-based works courts had to reinterpret the term “fixation” accordingly.  For 
instance, in Williams Electronics v. Arctic International, which involved alleged 
infringement of a video game, the defendant argued that the game was not “fixed” for 
purposes of copyright law, since its content and appearance can change depending upon 
individual player.168  It was also argued that the game as a result could potentially 
generate new images with each new player.169  The court has held that as long as the 
game was fixed in a tangible medium of expression from which it can be reproduced or 
communicated, whether directly or with an aid of a device, it had copyright 
protection.170  Thus even if the video game changes depending on the player, it is still 
copyrightable. 
 
Such expansion of the term fixation may also apply to certain works of indigenous 
intangible heritage that have some form of fixation, however transient.  For works that 
remain unfixed, such as performances, other means of protection may be available with 
regard to performers’ rights. 
                                                
167 White-Smith Music Publishing Company v. Apollo Company, 209 U.S. 1 (1908). 
168 Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic International Inc, 685 F.2d 870 (1982). 
169
 Id. at 874. 
170 Id. at 873-74. 
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3.2.1.4 Alternative Means of Protection of Unfixed Works 
 
The fact that the work is not yet fixed may actually prove to be advantageous for 
indigenous intellectual property as the “copyright term of protection begins to run when 
an original work is fixed.”171  This is particularly relevant to old works on which 
copyright would have run out.  As a result, should indigenous people record works such 
as music or songs thereby fixing them in a tangible medium of expression, valid 
copyright could then subsist from the moment the works are recorded. 
 
However, recording of intangible cultural heritage by their rightful owners to obtain 
copyright protection is of little use if the unfixed work had already been stolen, as was 
the case with Lifvon Guo’s chants.  Some jurisdictions can offer redress in cases of 
unauthorized recording when the work is not fixed, including the United States.  Under 
U.S. v. Martignon,172 if a musical performance is not fixed, copyright-like right could 
be claimed under 18 U.S.C. 2319A, which prohibits “unauthorized recording of 
performances as well as the copying distribution, sale, rental, and trafficking of these 
bootlegged phonorecords.”173  The statute has no time limitation.  In the case, 
Martignon ran a business which sold unauthorized recordings of live performances by 
certain artists.174  Upon the discovery of the sales, the Recording Industry Association 
of America (RIAA) then facilitated his arrest by the FBI under the statute.  Martignon 
challenged the constitutionality of the statute, arguing that the work needs to be fixed in 
order to receive copyright protection under U.S. Copyright Act, and further, because the 
statute had no statute of limitations, it was in violation of the Copyright Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution which requires that protection be granted for limited time only.  The 
Federal District Court struck down the statute as unconstitutional for these reasons.175  
However, on appeal to the 2nd Circuit the decision was reversed, and the court held that 
the statute was constitutional: the statute was properly enacted by Congress under its 
powers given to it by the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, not the Copyright 
                                                
171 Haight Farley, supra note 30, at 29. 
172 492 F.3d 140 (2007). 
173 Id. at 141. 
174 U.S. v. Martignon 346 F.Supp.2d 413, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
175 Id. at 424. 
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Clause.176  As a result, this statute can be applied to cases similar to that of Lifvon Guo, 
particularly since there is no time limitation, although it could not be applied to the case 
itself because of jurisdictional limitations.  
 
In addition, under WIPO Performances and Phonographs Treaty (WPPT) of 1996, 
performers have the exclusive right in their own performances.  Article 6 of the Treaty 
states that performers “shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing, as regards their 
performances: (i) the broadcasting and communication to the public of their unfixed 
performances except where the performance is already a broadcast performance; and 
(ii) the fixation of their unfixed performances.”177  France, which is a signatory to the 
treaty,178 could thus be held accountable for the unauthorized fixation of Lifvon Guo’s 
voice.  But because Taiwan is not a signatory, Lifvon Guo is not protected since under 
the treaty the contracting states are bound to give protection under the treaty only to the 
performers of other contracting states.179  However, the case of Lifvon Guo is a 
complex cross-jurisdictional dispute.  The effect of these two statutes should not be 
underestimated as in relevant circumstances both Title 18 U.S.C. 2319A and WPPT 
could be used to prevent unauthorized recordings of unfixed performances of 
indigenous works. 
 
3.2.2 Trademark Law 
 
Trademark law is distinguishable from other areas of intellectual property law in that it 
does not protect an intangible asset per se, rather it protects the trade activity associated 
with that asset.180  Trademark law protects the use of a particular mark or design in the 
course of trade, not the mark or design itself (although it may qualify for copyright 
protection on its own, depending on the originality of the design).181  It is further 
                                                
176 U.S. v. Martignon, 492 F.3d. 140 (2007). 
177 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty Art. 6 (1996). 
178 See WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/SearchForm.jsp?search_what=C.  
179 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty Art. 3(1) (1996). 
180 Paterson & Karjala, supra note 107, at 667. 
181 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 1051(a)(1) stating that “[t]he owner of a trademark used in commerce may 
request registration of its trademark on the principal register” (emphasis added),  Council Regulation 
(EC) No 207/2009 on the Community trade mark, Art. 9(1) stating “[t]he proprietor shall be entitled to 
prevent all third parties not having his consent from using in the course of trade . . .  .” (emphasis added); 
 35
distinguishable from other types of intellectual property protection, such as copyright 
and patent which grant protection for a limited time, by the fact that as long as the 
trademark remains in use and does not become generic, trademark protection can last 
indefinitely.  Another advantage of trademark protection is that it does not have some of 
the same problems of standing that for example copyright law may have with regard to 
who has the right to bring a lawsuit for infringement of intangible cultural heritage.  It is 
for these reasons that trademark law, in combination with copyright law, may provide 
adequate means of protection to certain types of intangible cultural heritage.182 
  
3.2.2.1 Deceptive Marks 
 
Trademarks or trade dress items that are deliberately marketed as indigenous but are 
actually produced by companies that mass-produce the products in a factory may be 
particularly detrimental to indigenous people.  Deceptive marks are detrimental in cases 
where indigenous people have established a trade where they sell some of their 
traditional designs to for example tourists, thus establishing a source of income for their 
community which in some cases may be a significant portion of their livelihood.  
Making traditional designs by the indigenous people involves time and effort.  However 
if a non-indigenous competitor decides to copy that design and manufacture the product 
at a lower cost and establish a competing trade, thus undercutting the indigenous trade, 
indigenous people may be able to get redress through the application of trademark law. 
  
The U.S. Lanham Act applies to both registered and unregistered marks.  Section 32 
allows actions for infringement of registered marks.183  Section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act gives rise to a cause of action for infringement of unregistered marks, prohibiting 
false designation of origin.184  False designation of origin would have application to 
deceptive marketing of indigenous designs when they are being passed off as having 
                                                                                                                                          
see also Directive 2008/95/EC to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade marks, 
Art.5.  Although an application may be filed prior to actual use, there must be intent to use that mark in 
the course of trade. 
182 Haight Farley, supra note 30, at 50. 
183 15 U.S.C. §1114. 
184 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A). See Zazu Designs v. L’Oreal, S.A. 979 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Through 
§43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15. U.S.C. §1125(a), a provision addressed to deceit, [federal law] allows the 
enforcement of unregistered marks.”). 
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been made by indigenous people when they indeed were not.  This section would 
therefore allow a Native American tribe or a representative thereof to bring an 
infringement action even if the mark or design in question is not federally registered 
against a non-Native American using that particular mark, provided certain other 
conditions are met.185   
 
The language of Section 43(a) is rather loose, stating that anyone who uses a mark as a 
false designation of origin will be civilly liable to any person “who believes that he or 
she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.”186  The plain language of the statute does 
not require the same association as for example between the specific work and the 
author that copyright law mandates, nor does it require that the mark in question be 
specifically used by a person trying to assert their rights; it is simply a requirement of a 
belief of damage by the infringing act. 187  As a result the statute is able to provide a 
remedy to a member of an indigenous tribe who is not specifically associated with that 
mark (for example, who is not the maker of the design or the product in question) but 
who nevertheless will be damaged by another’s use of that mark.188  Trademark law, 
because of its rather unique qualities in relation to other intellectual property rights, is 
therefore able to provide greater and more easily attainable protection for qualifying 
works of the indigenous people. 
 
In addition to the protection afforded by Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, the USPTO 
also affords specific protection to Native American Tribes with respect to their official 
insignia.  In 1998, President Bill Clinton signed Public Law 105-330, which mandated 
the USPTO to study how official Native American insignia may be protected under 
trademark law more effectively.189  Official insignia of Native American Tribes is 
defined as “the flag or coat of arms or other emblem or device of any federally or State 
                                                
185 In case of unregistered marks, use in commerce would have to be proved.  See, e.g. Zazu Designs v. 
L’Oreal S.A. 979 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1992). 
186 15 U.S.C. 1125(a)(1). 
187 The courts have interpreted this section as requiring only “proof providing a reasonable basis for the 
belief that the plaintiff is likely to be damaged” and no proof of actual damage is required.  Johnson & 
Johnson v. Carter-Wallance, Inc. 631 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1980). 
188 See id. (stating that the statute entitles a broad range of parties to relief). 
189 Gavin Clarkson, Racial Imagery and Native Americans: a First Look at the Empirical Evidence 
Behind the Indian Mascot Controversy, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 393 (2003), see also U.S. Pat. 
& Trademark Off., Report on the Official Insignia of Native American Tribes (1999) (hereinafter USPTO 
study), available at www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/insgstdy.pdf.  
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recognized Native American tribe, as adopted by tribal resolution and notified to the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.”190 The study found that USPTO provides 
substantial protection against misrepresentation of Native American produced goods.191  
Particularly, since 1994 the USPTO has taken steps to examine trademark applications 
“containing tribal names, recognizable likenesses of Native Americans, symbols 
perceived as being Native American in origin, and any other application which the PTO 
believes suggests an association with Native Americans” with special scrutiny and 
refuse registration of such marks if there is any indication of false association with 
Native Americans or their possible disparagement.192   
 
The study also points to the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1935193 as another avenue of 
protection against the misrepresentation in marketing of Native American arts and 
crafts.  The Act makes it both a civil and criminal violation to offer or display for sale 
of “any good . . . in a manner that falsely suggests it is Indian produced, an Indian 
product, or the product of a particular Indian or Indian tribe or Indian arts and crafts 
organization, resident within the United States.”194  The criminal violation entails both a 
fine and imprisonment.195  A civil action may also be brought, in which case the 
plaintiff may be entitled to injunctive relief and treble damages along with punitive 
damages.196  The Act specifically states that among the persons entitled to bring a civil 
action may be “an Indian tribe on behalf of itself, an Indian who is a member of the 
tribe, or on behalf of an Indian arts and crafts organization”197 thus giving standing to 
the specific Native American tribe or a representative of that tribe.  The Act also 
establishes the Indian Arts and Crafts Board which may register trademarks and bring 
an action for trademark infringement on behalf of federally recognized Native 
American tribes.198  Overall it seems, with both criminal prosecution and ability to bring 
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193 25 U.S.C. §305 et seq. 
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a civil cause of action by individuals, the protection offered by the Indian Arts and 
Crafts Act is substantial with respect to misrepresentation of Native American goods. 
 
The USPTO study concluded as a result of both its internal procedures with regard to 
Native American insignia and Indian Arts and Crafts Act, further legislation in this area 
of law is unnecessary, but it recommended for an establishment of a comprehensive 
database of official Native American insignia.199  Such database was subsequently 
established.200 The study further concluded that “existing trademark law provides the 
legal tools necessary to prohibit registration of ‘official insignia’ or simulations thereof, 
where the applicant is not the Native American tribal owner.”201  For example, one 
application for “Zia” mark to be used in connection with cocktail mixes was refused on 
the ground that it would give false association with the Pueblo of Zia, and because of 
the nature of the product could be perceived as “possible disparagement of the tribe.”202   
 
Unfortunately the Harjo decision discussed above falls outside the scope of the 
protection discussed in the study.  The study specifically stated that the issues raised by 
the Harjo decision “fall in the category of ‘other social ills’ which may have trademark 
implications, but do not involve ‘official insignia of Native American tribes’”203 as the 
term “Redskins” is not an emblem adopted by any tribe. 
 
Furthermore the Indian Arts and Crafts Act and the USPTO policy with regard to 
official Native American insignia are only applicable to products where there is a 
possibility of false association between the product and a particular tribe.  That is, when 
the product sold is claimed to be made by or somehow associated with Native 
Americans.  Some of the criticism of U.S. trademark protection of intangible cultural 
heritage is that it would not “prevent non-indigenous persons from making new 
                                                
199 USPTO Study, supra note 189. 
200 Establishment of a Database Containing the Official Insignia of Federally Recognized Native 
American Tribes, 66 Fed. Reg. 6 1649 (2001), see also, Clarkson, supra note 189, at 406. 
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203 USPTO Study, supra note 189. 
 39
products that merely incorporate indigenous motifs. As long as these products are not 
marketed as ‘Indian made,’ they will be permitted.”204 
 
3.2.2.2 Disparaging Marks 
 
The Harjo case discussed in Part 2 puts a heavy burden on Native Americans to 
diligently search new registrations of potentially disparaging marks and bring 
cancellation proceedings as soon as possible.  Despite the fact that the registration of the 
disparaging mark still stands, however, the Harjo case nevertheless serves as an 
important precedent for similar cases that may arise in the future.  First, under Section 
2(a) of the Lanham Act, no intent to disparage is needed; the mere fact of 
disparagement to the group as perceived by that group is enough.205  Second, the 
decisions clarify that in order for there to be a cancellation under disparagement, a 
“substantial composite” of the group must perceive it as disparaging.206  Third it stands 
for the proposition that though the laches defense may bar older members of the group 
from bringing the petition, since laches begins to run only from the date of the 
petitioner’s majority, younger members of the group may still bring the cancellation 
proceeding.207   
 
Despite the ruling in this particular case, what is important is that the cancellation on 
the basis of disparagement is available for Native Americans. If new registrations were 
filed today that would be perceived as disparaging by Native Americans, the 
cancellation (or opposition) applications may then be filed.  Indeed the District Court 
was careful to point out on two separate occasions that the decision itself made no 
statement on the appropriateness of derogatory use of such names.208 
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3.2.2.3 Certification and Collective Marks 
 
Both certification and collective marks can be used by groups, and as a result they can 
be used to protect group rights of the indigenous people.209  There is some evidence that 
such use of the marks is increasing among indigenous people.210  Under the U.S. 
Lanham Act, a collective mark is defined as a mark “used by the members of a 
cooperative, an association, or other collective group or organization . . . and includes 
marks indicating membership in a union, an association, or other organization.”211 A 
certification mark is used by a person “to certify regional or other origin, material, 
mode of manufacture, quality, accuracy, or other characteristics of such person’s goods 
or services or that the work or labor on the goods or services was performed by 
members of a union or other organization.”212  As a result, certification marks may 
prove to be particularly important for indigenous intangible cultural heritage. 
 
Indigenous designs are becoming more and more popular in the main stream culture.  
From Native American bracelets to Aboriginal designs printed on T-shirts and rugs, 
there is a growing demand for products with native or tribal patterns, images and 
symbols.  However it may nevertheless be important to the consumers buying these 
products to know that these products indeed come from a legitimate source.  For 
instance, the artists in Milpurrurru case were alerted as to the infringement of their art 
by a would-be buyer of the rugs who wanted to ensure that the rugs had a legitimate 
copyright license before purchasing them.213  A person buying a bracelet with a Native 
American motif might want to know that it was made by a Native American, and not 
mass-produced in an Asian sweat shop.  The official Quileute e-commerce store 
encourages the consumer to “be authentic.”214  Indeed, authenticity “has already been 
recognized as an important tool in the protection of intangible goods.”215  Certification 
marks have the ability to assure the buyer that the product comes from a legitimate 
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source.216  They can also be used to assure the buyer the product comports with 
particular standards adopted by the manufacturer.217  Thus the affixation of a 
certification mark may be used by indigenous people to certify that a product is indeed a 
genuine product. 
 
3.3 Unfair Competition and Related Rights 
 
This section discusses unfair competition and other equitable doctrines in existence in 
common law jurisdictions which may be used to fill some of the gaps in intellectual 
property protection of intangible cultural heritage.  Creating new legal regimes to patch 
the gaps in intellectual property protection of intangible cultural heritage may pose 
more problems rather than solutions.  Indeed it may cause “fundamental conflicts 
between cultural heritage protection and the basic notions of free expression in 
democratic societies that are the underlying policy basis for the limitations we find in 
the current IPR regimes.”218  Intellectual property protection is typically granted for a 
limited time to give the author or inventor of a work incentive to share that work with 
the public, without the fear that someone else might take credit for it or financially 
benefit from it.  However this protection is also balanced with the notion that the work 
should eventually enter public domain for new authors to create new works and 
inventions based on preexisting works.219  Making new legal regimes to allow perpetual 
protection of intellectual property may face unconstitutionality challenges in some 
jurisdictions, such as the U.S. where the Constitution expressly states protection to 
copyrightable and patentable works is to be extended for a limited time. 
  
For some of the same reasons the doctrine of unfair competition and other equitable 
doctrines such as quasi-contracts can fit nicely with intellectual property law to extend 
adequate protection to intangible cultural heritage without the need for new sui generis 
intellectual property law.  Equitable doctrines have traditionally been used by courts to 
rectify an imbalance created when a stronger party takes advantage of the weaker one 
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and unjustly profits as a result.  They have also been used to correct cases of 
fundamental unfairness, when remedy is lacking in the current law.  Such imbalance 
and unfairness occurs for example when a party gains the trust of indigenous people to 
obtain certain medicinal knowledge known only to that tribe to then reap profits from 
that knowledge by making a new patent.  As will be discussed below, this injustice may 
be corrected by the means of equity.  Such “more modest” alternatives to new 
legislation in this area may not only solve some of the problems left open by intellectual 
property law, it would also generate much less tension with fundamental principles 
behind intellectual property rights.220 
 
3.3.1 Right of Publicity 
 
The right of publicity is applicable to cases of appropriation of a person’s name or 
image to be used to advertise the appropriator’s product or service.  The right of 
publicity has been described as the “inherent right of every human being to control the 
commercial use of his or her identity.”221  It is considered to be a tort of invasion of 
privacy and consists of three elements that must be met: defendant appropriated the 
plaintiff’s name or likeness for the value associated with it, the plaintiff can be 
identified from the publication at issue and there was some advantage or benefit to the 
defendant.222  Although the doctrine could potentially be applied to the use of an image 
of, for example, a Native American without his or her consent for purposes of 
advertising, in the past this doctrine has been applied by courts to protect the 
commercial interest of celebrities.223  It is therefore questionable whether it can be used 
to appropriation of the image of an indigenous person or a tribe in advertising unless 
that person or tribe are well known and possess commercial value in their identity.  
However this issue of first impression may still be entertained by a court. 
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3.3.2 Misappropriation 
 
The doctrine of misappropriation has been first applied by U.S. Supreme Court in INS v. 
Associated Press.224  At issue was that INS, a competitor of Associated Press, was 
taking news reports published by Associated Press and using them without payment.  
No copyright subsisted in the news as they were effectively uncopyrightable facts.  The 
court found that INS had nonetheless engaged in unfair competition by using the reports 
published by Associated Press.225  The court held that the defendant was “taking 
material that has been acquired by complainant as the result of organization and the 
expenditure of labor, skill, and money, and . . . is endeavoring to reap where it has not 
sown.”226  Since this decision, the application of this doctrine has been limited to “hot-
news” or information that is highly time-sensitive taken by a party in direct competition 
with the plaintiff.227  
 
Even though this doctrine has been limited, its implications for the rights of indigenous 
people are still important.  In INS v. Associated Press the court was able to extend 
protection to uncopyrightable information—facts—that had commercial value.  Indeed, 
it seems at least “the spirit of the misappropriation doctrine in the INS case seems 
consistent with indigenous misappropriation claims.”228 
 
3.3.3 Quasi-Contract and Equitable Estoppel 
 
The quasi-contract may be applied to cases of appropriation of potentially commercially 
valuable indigenous knowledge.  Knowledge or facts are generally not subject to 
intellectual property protection.  There is evidence that traditional knowledge of 
indigenous people, especially medicinal knowledge, has been widely exploited.  For 
example, when pharmaceutical researchers utilize indigenous knowledge of medicinal 
qualities of certain plants, the possibility of developing at least one marketable drug 
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increases from twenty-two to seventy eight percent.229  Moreover, twenty-five percent 
of all prescription drugs in the United States contain an active ingredient that is derived 
from indigenous medicinal knowledge of plants.  There is therefore no question about 
the enormous financial value of indigenous knowledge of medicinal qualities of certain 
plants. 
 
It is unlikely that the medicinal plant knowledge would quality for patent protection as 
such knowledge would be deemed a discovery rather than an invention.  Scientists at 
pharmaceutical companies, however, have the technological capacity to extract the 
particular compound from the plants and manufacture a drug qualifying for patent 
protection, thus gaining the legal protection of patent law under which indigenous 
people would have no remedy.  However, the quasi-contract, which is “an equitable 
notion of unjust enrichment related to breach of a confidential relationship”230 may be 
applicable in such situations.  It is generally applied to cases where there has been a 
conferral of a benefit on the defendant—such as obtaining valuable information—who 
is then enriched as a result of that benefit, especially where there was undue advantage 
taken of the plaintiff.  Such undue advantage may occur for instance if the defendant 
obtained the requisite information through misrepresentation or in bad faith with the 
intent to profit from that information.231  This doctrine has been applied to cases where 
a person supplies an idea for a motion picture, and that idea is then used to make a film 
without compensation to the supplier.232  By extension it could thus also be applied to 
indigenous “ideas” for a patentable drug.  However this doctrine is also problematic: it 
is decided on a case-by-case basis and as a result is not applied uniformly.233 
 
3.3.4 Trade Secrets and the Duty of Confidence 
 
Knowledge that is possessed only by a small group of individuals and is therefore not 
known to the public may be subject to trade secret protection.  Trade secret law is 
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generally applicable to commercially valuable information that is kept in confidence 
and is used in business.234  However, a related common law doctrine of breach of the 
duty of confidence with respect to intangible cultural heritage has been applied by an 
Australian court in Foster v. Mountford.235  The plaintiffs were members of an 
Aboriginal community called the Pitjantjara people who sought an interlocutory 
injunction to prevent the publication of defendants’ book, Nomads of the Australian 
Desert.236  The defendants in this case were the book’s author, Mountford, and the 
book’s publisher.237   
 
The plaintiffs argued that thirty-five years prior to the proceedings, Mountford came to 
their area to collect anthropological information.238  During his exploration he was 
taken into the confidence of the Pitjantjara people, who showed and explained to 
Mountford and his crew the secrets of their people, including sacred grounds, objects, 
as well as art.239  Much of this information was later published in Mountford’s book, 
revealing the secrets of the Pitjantjara people.240  According to the customs of the 
Pitjantjara people, some of the secrets revealed in the book could not be revealed to 
“women, children and uninitiated men” of the tribe, and their revelation in the book 
could thus cause grave harm to the Pitjantjara community.241  The book contained a 
disclaimer that where Australian aborigines were concerned, this book should only be 
used after consultation with the religious leaders of the tribe, however the book was 
freely available for sale to the public.242 
 
The court found that the plaintiffs demonstrated “a genuine fear that the book may 
further disrupt their social system” as the secrets may “be revealed to those to whom it 
was always understood it would not be revealed.”243  The court also found that the 
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information contained in the book could only have been communicated in confidence 
that Mountford himself accepted at the time of its revelation.244    
 
The court, in considering whether the injunction should be granted, relied on the 
principles of equity rather than law.  The court wrote that “it is quite clear that, 
independently of any question as to the right at law, the Court of Chancery always had 
an original and independent jurisdiction to prevent what the court considered and 
treated as a wrong . . . .”245  The court held that plaintiffs have established a prima facie 
case that defendant’s conduct was the breach of the duty of confidence and issued an 
interlocutory injunction.246  The court also briefly considered the issue of standing, 
stating that plaintiffs here “sue on their own behalf, not merely as members or 
representatives of the Pitjantjara people . . . . They allege that they, as individuals are 
threatened with damage” and as a result the plaintiffs were “entitled to bring this action 
in its present form.”247  Although this case only considered the question with regard to 
issuing an interlocutory injunction, and other issues such as plaintiffs’ entitlement to 
damages were not considered, it still demonstrates that courts are prepared to use the 
principles of equity to arrive at just results for indigenous people. 
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4 Additional Solutions: WIPO and Digital Documentation 
 
The efforts of World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) with respect to 
protection of intangible cultural heritage have been considerable.  For example in 1998, 
it began exploring intellectual property needs and expectations of traditional knowledge 
holders all over the globe.248  In 2000 it set up the Inter-governmental Committee on 
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore.  The committee has conducted 
a comprehensive survey on existing forms of intellectual property protection of 
traditional knowledge.249  More recently, WIPO has been making efforts to promote 
digital documentation of intangible cultural heritage.   
 
Digital documentation of intangible cultural heritage by the indigenous communities 
can patch some of the gaps in copyright protection of indigenous cultural heritage.  In 
particular, digital documentation can resolve the problem of lack of fixation or 
identifiable author, and therefore constitutes an additional avenue of protection for 
indigenous people, supplementing the means of protection discussed above. 
    
4.1 Advantages of Digital Documentation 
 
Digital documentation is defined as the use of software, technology and digital rights 
management tools to document and record intangible cultural heritage.250  Creation of 
databases of digitally recorded indigenous works can then be compiled.  Such 
documentation would allow indigenous people to not only preserve indigenous 
intellectual property for future generations, but also have the requisite legal means to 
protect it against infringement.  Specifically, it would fill some of the gaps in copyright 
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law with respect to intangible cultural heritage including lack of fixation and authorship 
with regard to native performances such as music, song, and choreography.251  The 
digital recording of such works on a tangible medium would provide the requisite 
element of fixation.  In addition once a particular indigenous community digitally 
documents their intangible cultural heritage “the copyright of the recordings of the 
digital databases vest in the indigenous communities because they become the ‘author’ 
or creator of the documentations.”252  
 
WIPO offers assistance and advice to communities “wishing to record, digitize and 
disseminate their traditional music, performances, art, designs and other creative 
expressions of traditional cultures for safeguarding, promotional and commercial 
purposes.”253  In particular, WIPO is interested in providing communities with 
information with regard to how to identify and manage their intellectual property rights.  
Proper IPR management requires relevant intellectual property information about each 
recording.  “This information, for example, identifies the recording, the holder(s) of 
rights in the recording, and any usage rules associated with the recording, including 
rules derived from customary laws and practices.”254  IPR management as a result can 
prevent misappropriation or misuse of the recorded intangible cultural heritage.255  
WIPO also maintains a list of digital recording databases maintained by communities 
through its Creative Heritage Digital Gateway.  Individual communities may be 
contacted through this Gateway for information or for permission to use these 
recordings.256  
 
Digital recording of intangible cultural heritage would give notice to the public with 
regard to copyright ownership of the relevant work and would also enable indigenous 
communities to have greater self-determination and control with regard to who can be 
granted the right to use such works.257  In addition to providing the missing elements 
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under copyright law and therefore granting such work copyright protection, digitally 
documented works may also benefit from the legal protection of digital rights 
management systems.258   
 
4.2 Potential Challenges and Implications for the Future 
 
There may be some problems with viability of implementing a system of digital 
documentation of indigenous intangible cultural heritage.  One of such problems is cost: 
as both documenting and creating a comprehensive database of such work is extremely 
expensive, it may be outside of the financial capacity of indigenous people.  Another 
such problem is that it may actually result in more infringement, as a greater amount of 
indigenous works would be publicly available.  However, some have argued that this 
risk of misappropriation should not deter indigenous communities from using this tool, 
as software and digital rights management tools can adjust to meet the needs of 
indigenous communities by means of defining and controlling the rights and 
accessibility to the digital recordings.259  What is particularly significant is that digital 
documentation of intangible cultural heritage “shows how a modern, technological tool 
can be converged with traditional culture.”260 
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5 Conclusion 
 
The debate whether the current law is sufficient to grant adequate protection to 
indigenous people versus arguments for new legislation is a continuing one.  Before 
efforts are made at implementing new law in this area, all the legal tools currently 
available must be carefully evaluated.  Some indigenous intellectual property can be 
effectively protected by intellectual property law, as long as it meets all of the required 
elements.261  For example, copyright law has been applied effectively for Aboriginal 
paintings, but it may not be sufficient with regards to unfixed works such as oral 
traditions, live performances and songs.  As a result, intellectual property laws alone 
may not be sufficient to extend protection to indigenous intangible cultural heritage in 
every instance.  In instances where intellectual property protection fails, the doctrine of 
equity and unfair competition may be used to fill some of the gaps.  Some courts, such 
as the Australian courts in Milpurrurru, Bulun Bulun, and Foster cases have already 
began applying equitable doctrines to extend protection to Aboriginal works.  Other 
common law jurisdictions may look to Australian courts in terms of application of these 
doctrines to intangible cultural heritage as persuasive authority.262  In addition, digital 
documentation of intangible cultural heritage may also be used to fill some of the gaps 
in intellectual property law to extend protection to intangible cultural heritage.   
 
Furthermore, there is a balance between free information and proprietary rights.  
Culture exists in part so that new works can be built off of it.  Intellectual property laws 
exist to encourage this development—to grant protection to new works for a limited 
time until those works themselves fall into public domain.  On the one hand not all 
cultural works should be protected because this would significantly hinder further 
cultural development.  However it is also fundamentally unfair to exploit indigenous 
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cultures so that others can maliciously profit to the detriment of indigenous people.  
Such exploitation, examples of which were discussed earlier, certainly cannot be what 
was intended by the delicate balance struck between intellectual property rights and 
freedom of information. 
 
On the other hand, to grant sui generis rights to indigenous heritage may present 
problems of its own.  Some such laws propose indefinite copyright protection, which in 
some jurisdictions is unconstitutional.  This also goes against the grain of the balance of 
intellectual property protection and freedom of information.  As a result a blanket 
protection for indigenous cultural works by virtue of sui generis rights may upset this 
balance, while using already existing law will not.  Because many of the legal concepts 
discussed above involve equity, a judge would have it in her discretion to consider all 
the circumstances in each case to maintain such balance. 
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